Introduction
There are different opinions as to the process whereby double taxation agreements (DTAs) are incorporated into South African law. This contribution aims to discuss some of the existing opinions and to offer a further perspective on the matter.
It is important to determine the method of incorporation of DTAs, as this may influence, inter alia, the persons entitled to rely on the DTA, the timing of such reliance and also whether domestic legislation promulgated subsequently to the DTA and which conflicts with the DTA, will apply in preference to the DTA (a so-called treaty override). 1 Thus, examining the process of the incorporation of DTAs into South
African law involves an investigation into the status of DTAs in terms of South African law.
At the heart of the debate lies the interpretation of two provisions, namely section 231 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 2 (the Constitution) and section 108 of the Income Tax Act 3 and the interaction between the two.
Section 231 of the Constitution reads as follows:
(1) The negotiating and signing of all international agreements is the responsibility of the national executive. (2) An international agreement binds the Republic only after it has been approved by resolution in both the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, unless it is an agreement referred to in subsection (3). (3) An international agreement of a technical, administrative or executive nature, or an agreement which does not require either ratification or accession, entered into by the national executive, binds the Republic without approval by the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, but must be tabled in the Assembly and the Council within a reasonable time. (4) Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted into law by national legislation; but a self-executing provision of an agreement that has been approved by Parliament is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament. (5) The Republic is bound by international agreements which were binding on the Republic when this Constitution took effect.
Section 108 of the Income Tax Act provides that:
(1) The National Executive may enter into an agreement with the government of any other country, whereby arrangements are made with such government with a view to the prevention, mitigation or discontinuance of the levying, under the laws of the Republic and of such other country, of tax in respect of the same income, profits or gains, or tax imposed in respect of the same donation, or to the rendering of reciprocal assistance in the administration of and the collection of taxes under the said laws of the Republic and of such other country. (2) As soon as may be after the approval by Parliament of any such agreement, as contemplated in section 231 of the Constitution, the arrangements thereby made shall be notified by publication in the Gazette and the arrangements so notified shall thereupon have effect as if enacted in this Act. Dugard states that a treaty will be self-executing "only if the language of the treaty so indicates and existing municipal law, either common law, or statute, is adequate in the sense that it fails to place any obstacle in the way of treaty application". 15 Ferreira and Scholtz prefer Dugard's approach, because it proposes that domestic law, and not the treaty, should be the starting point of the enquiry. They suggest that a South
African court should first establish the extent to which domestic law permits the application of the provisions of the treaty and only subsequently decide whether the specific treaty should be declared to be self-executing. 16 The position in the United
States of America (which is the source of the above definition) differs from that in South Africa because in the United States of America all treaties are self-executing by nature. However, in exceptional circumstances, provisions in American treaties require enactment in legislation. Whether or not these circumstances arise is determined by domestic legislation. 17 South Africa, on the other hand, clearly requires enactment into domestic law (the second step, described above) for a treaty to become binding on subjects of the state. The treaty itself can therefore not determine its self-executing status, since it is domestic law that determines its enforceability by subjects of the state. 18 If one assumes that the reference to self-executing provisions in the Constitution cannot be ignored, those provisions require interpretation in order to determine whether a DTA can be regarded as self-executing. Only the definition cited in Goodwin (quoted above) has been approved (obiter) by a South African court and it is submitted that this definition must therefore be used as the basis for attaching a meaning to the concept. However, as indicated above, the first inquiry should be whether domestic law allows for the application of the provisions of the treaty. The provisions of the treaty itself are only considered thereafter. Applying this interpretation to DTAs, one therefore has to determine whether domestic law, that is, the Income Tax Act (and 15 Dugard International Law 57. Section 231(4) of the Constitution; Ferreira and Scholtz 2009 CILSA 270. not the relevant DTA), allows for the application of the provisions of the DTA. At least two reasons may be advanced why the Income Tax Act does not allow for the application of the DTA without a further legislative act. First, section 108(2) of the Income Tax Act requires that notification by publication in the Government Gazette takes place and only once this has happened, will the DTA become part of the Income Tax Act. The Income Tax Act therefore places an obstacle (to use Dugard's words), namely, publication in the Government Gazette, in the way of the application of a DTA.
Second, the very nature of a DTA is that it conflicts with the Income Tax Act. The Income Tax Act imposes a liability to income tax and, if applicable, the DTA may provide relief from that liability. The DTA cannot, therefore, apply automatically. A further legislative step is needed to indicate the relationship between the DTA and the Income Tax Act. Section 108(2) of the Income Tax Act fulfils this function by stating that the DTA, when published in the Government Gazette, shall have effect as if enacted in the Act.
Section 108(2) of the Income Tax Act
As was argued above, if a DTA is not self-executing, it can only become part of domestic law if it is enacted into law by national legislation. 19 According to Dugard there are three methods by which treaties can be transformed into domestic law. First, the provisions of a treaty may be set out in an Act of Parliament. Second, the treaty may be included in an Act as a schedule thereto, or third, "an enabling Act of Parliament may give the executive the power to bring a treaty into effect in municipal law by means of proclamation or notice in the Government Gazette". 20 In the case of DTAs, the first two methods mentioned by Dugard are not followed. It is submitted, however, that the third method is used through section 108(2) of the Income Tax Act. This sub-section, which provides that the DTA shall be notified by publication in the Government Gazette and the DTA shall Thus, they became part of South African law as they were approved by the legislature under these provisions and duly gazetted. One view holds that DTAs take precedence over the Income Tax Act. This view is based on the opinion that treaty obligations have the same force as the Constitution, that is, they occupy the highest possible level. 27 According to this view, the DTA will, consequently, take precedence over the Income Tax Act and a court will apply the DTA in preference to the Income Tax Act. However, the Constitutional Court in Glenister stated that:
It follows that the incorporation of an international agreement creates ordinary domestic statutory obligations. Incorporation by itself does not transform the rights and obligations in it into constitutional rights and obligations. Assuming that it has been incorporated into South African domestic law. 27 Hattingh "Elimination of International Double Taxation" para 36.14.
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Glenister v President of the RSA 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) para 181.
In the light of the Glenister judgement, the view that DTAs create rights and obligations on a par with the Constitution cannot be supported.
In a previous contribution the present author examined South African case law on this point and reached the following conclusion:
[I]t is submitted that three views may be distinguished: • The view expounded in AM Moolla, namely, that the treaty forms part of the relevant Act and, in the case of conflict between the general provisions of the relevant Act and particular provisions of the treaty, the Act must prevail. However, the treaty must be construed in such a way as to avoid any conflict between the Act and the terms of the treaty. In AM Moolla the Court found, on the facts, that the Act gave content to the expressions used in the treaty, with the result that no conflict arose between the Act and the treaty.
• The Supreme Court of Appeal in Tradehold was of the view that a double taxation treaty modifies the domestic law and will apply in preference to the domestic law to the extent that there is any conflict.
• In Glenister both the minority and the majority judgments indicated that ordinary domestic statutory obligations are created once a treaty is domesticated via legislation. The minority was of the view that if there is a conflict between a domesticated international agreement and other domestic legislation, the conflict must be resolved by the application of the principles of statutory interpretation and superseding legislation. The judgment in Van Kets seems to follow the minority judgment in Glenister to the extent that the Court in Van Kets found the provisions of a double taxation treaty to rank at least on a par with domestic law and that the provisions of the Act and the double taxation treaty should, therefore, be "reconciled and read as one coherent whole".
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Although the present author expressed a preference for the view of the minority in Glenister and suggested the principles of interpretation that should be followed to resolve the conflict, it was acknowledged that in future courts would probably follow the view in Tradehold in relation to DTAs.
Other academic contributions have expressed contrasting views. Marais 30 opines that a DTA will prevail (although it is not guaranteed) over domestic law as a result of the domestic interpretation rules. He argues that although treaty override seems Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) . Art 31 reads as follows: "General rule of interpretation 1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended." Marais's argument might then be that this rule of interpretation (which is assumed to be customary international law) may not be applied in such a way, because its application is in conflict with the provisions of domestic legislation (the Income Tax Act).
However, article 31 of the Vienna Convention, which obliges South Africa to interpret DTAs in a way that avoids double taxation, does not conflict with the provisions of the Income Tax Act. DTAs should therefore be interpreted in keeping with article 31 of the Vienna Convention (assuming it is customary international law). If the result of such an interpretation is that the Income Tax Act imposes tax in conflict with the DTA, it is submitted that the approach of the minority in Glenister should, ideally, be used to resolve the conflict, a point to which I shall return. view. Instead, their arguments are based on an interpretation of section 108 of the Income Tax Act. They argue that it would not make sense to interpret section 108 of the Income Tax Act in such a way that taxation will not be eliminated in the case of conflict between the provisions of the Income Tax Act and a DTA. In their view, section 108 would become meaningless if such an interpretation were to be followed. 38 However, it is submitted that it is not the interpretation of section 108 that is relevant, but rather the interpretation of the relevant section of the Income Tax Act that imposes the tax and the provisions of the DTA. 39 Costa and Stack furthermore argue that a conflict between the provisions of the Income Tax Act and those of a DTA results in an ambiguity to which the contra fiscum principle should be applied. They also argue that the principle that the same amount should not be taxed twice in the hands of the same person (the rule against "double taxation"), should apply. The result of these arguments is that DTAs should be given precedence over the provisions of the Income Tax Act. 40 It is submitted that these arguments cannot be supported. A conflict between the provisions of the Income Tax Act and a DTA does not result in an ambiguity (to which the contra fiscum principle would apply). Rather, the principles dealing with conflicting provisions should be applied to such a situation. 41 Furthermore, the rule against double taxation is not applicable in these circumstances, as it is not the Income Tax Act that imposes tax twice on the same taxpayer. The Income Tax Act imposes tax only once. Double taxation results from tax imposed by another state on the same income to which the Income Tax Act applies. The DTA provides relief from this double taxation under certain circumstances. Whether this relief is applicable, given the conflicting provisions of the Income Tax Act, is in issue. Consequently, there is no question of double taxation imposed by the Income Tax Act under these circumstances. 42 It is submitted that the status of DTAs in South Africa is determined by the Constitution. It is furthermore submitted that the Constitution allows for the possibility that South Africa's DTAs may be overridden by subsequent legislation (for example, by amendments to the Income Tax Act). 43 Whether an override will take place in a specific case should, it is submitted, be determined by the application of the principles of statutory interpretation which apply in the case of conflict. Although these submissions find support in the minority judgement in Glenister, both the AM Moolla and the Tradehold decisions express contrary views (as set out above). It is hoped that the South African courts will provide clarity on this matter in due course.
Conclusion
It is important to determine the method by which DTAs are incorporated into South African law. For example, if DTAs are self-executing, taxpayers and the relevant revenue authorities will be able to rely on the relevant DTA as soon as it has been approved by both houses of Parliament and they would not have to wait for its enactment into law by national legislation. It is acknowledged that the meaning of the concept "self-executing provision" is problematic. However, it is submitted that the definition quoted in the Goodwin decision should be used as a basis to attach a meaning to the concept at this stage, but that the first enquiry should be whether the Income Tax Act allows the application of the DTA. Two reasons were advanced why this is not so. Consequently, DTAs cannot be regarded as self-executing. Rather, DTAs are incorporated into South African law through section 108(2) of the Income Tax Act.
This sub-section empowers the executive to bring the DTA into effect by publication 42 As stated above, the purposes of the DTA, namely to avoid double taxation, should be taken into account when interpreting the DTA.
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Should treaty override take place, South Africa will be in breach of its duties in terms of international law. It has also been observed that the South African government has not enacted legislation intended to override a DTA ( 
